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ABSTRACT
This report reviews various mathematical models of use
in relating ship readiness and system reliability to repair
capability. It includes a model that describes the possible
effects of preventive maintenance upon readiness. Certain




ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR SUPPLEMENTING SHIP MANNING SIMULATIONS
Donald P . Gaver
Naval Postgraduate School
1. Introduction .
Complex computer simulations, such as that dubbed SHIP II by
the Naval Personnel Research and Development Lab, have been developed
for the purpose of studying the effectiveness of manpower on board a
ship. These simulations attempt to adhere closely to Naval manning
doctrine, and are elaborate and detailed, require extensive data
inputs, and are expensive to run.
I suggest that such complex models are often usefully paralleled
and supplemented by a family of simple analytical or mathematical
models, i.e. mathematical structures that, while simplified and
abstract, can be manipulated by mathematical techniques. While such
models may appear oversimplified or naive, their true function is to
provide a broad-brush picture of an admittedly complicated situation
and to help explain qualitative phenomena revealed by simulation runs.
The existence of a mathematical or probabilistic model that is suscep-
tible to mathematical or simple numerical manipulation also provides
one way of checking an elaborate (and accident prone) simulation
program. In addition, such a model may serve well as a variance reduc-
tion agent; see the account of the "control variables" technique in
Gaver [2], and its application in Gaver and Shedler [3].
In this paper I will outline and explore a selection of the kinds
of mathematical models that seem especially relevant in the SHIP II
context. Further elaborations will be deferred for study in later reports
2. The "Repairman"' Model Type .
The SHIP II model's impact for manpower planning stems from
its capacity to relate ship readiness to manning. That is, certain
tasks must routinely be required of the crew (evolutions, watch
standing, etc.), while others arise in an unpredictable or random
manner, as is true of corrective maintenance that is called for when
crucial equipments or systems fail. If such failures happen close
together in time it may be that waiting will occur for the beginning
of repair if few, or inexperienced, repairmen are aboard ship. The
reason is that repair backlogs will tend to exist. We wish to analyze
the relationship between the supply of repairmen and the readiness or
availability of key equipments aboard ship.
Classical models or model types that relate to the above ques-
tion are the "repairman 1 ' models; see Feller [1], and Morse [4]. We
outline the usual model assumptions and their most transparent conse-
quences. Then we discuss realistic modifications.
(2.1) Simplest Assumptions .
Suppose that m(m^l) failure-prone equipments are maintained
by a group of repairmen. Classically, individual repairmen were
authorized to carry out service, but in the real context teams of
various constitutions and sizes are required. For the moment suppose
that r(r^l) teams are available. Let all equipments have the same
basic failure rate, A, and let y denote the repair rate (so —
is mean or expected repair time) . A single instance of repair time,
R, is an exponentially distributed random variable, and the time to
failure of an individual equipment is also exponential. All of these
variables are mutually independent. Already we take note of several
heroic simplifying assumptions, some of which can be relaxed in a
straightforward manner, as we will show. For example, failure times
of different equipments will not have the same exponential distribu-
tion, nor will repair times. In particular, repair times do not now
reflect behavioral factors such as learning and training (neither
does the current version of SHIP II) . But if a complex simulation,
say, allows for arbitrary distributions, then when we specialize to
exponentials the simulation should give the same answers as do our
models. Thus our models furnish a means of checking internal validity,
To the extent that the specific distributional assumptions are
irrelevant (for example, results may depend only upon the means of
the distributions) then the models furnish formulas that can actually
replace time-consuming, expensive, error-prone simulations. This is
something to consider and exploit.
Finally, the models assume that repairs are conducted in the
arrival order of the failures, without priority assignments. And only
the long-run or steady state solutions are found.
(2.2) Model Questions and Answers .
Let P (t) denote the probability that exactly n equipments
n
are "down" for repair at time t after, say, a mission or tour com-




(0) =1 if the shore repair facilities are successfully preparing
the vessel for its tour.
Now Feller ([1], Chap. XVII, Section 7) describes the way in
which the latter problem may be formulated as a birth and death process
I will not repeat the mathematical arguments here. In summary the
results and their usefulness in present context, are as follows.
(a) Differential equations are derived for P (t) in terms of
A, u, m, and r. The latter are capable of explicit solution
in terms of exponentials, but these solutions are complicated.
Of more use are numerical solutions, presented graphically.
For example
,
one can tabulate the average (mean, or expected)
number of equipments down (unready) and undergoing or awaiting
repair at a particular time during a mission as the latter
depends upon manning level, r.
(b) It is pointed out that as t, the time that elapses following
mission start, becomes large (t-*»)
,
then P (t) approaches
a limit, p . This limiting, or steady-state probability
distribution can be found nearly explicitly. Actually it is
easiest to write down the "probability balance equations"
(n+l)u pn+1 = (m-n)A p , n < r
r u pn+1
= (m-n)A pR , n :> r
(2.1)
and solve them numerically on a computer. That is, we start with
p = k p., k_ = 1, substitute into the above equations and
n n
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n=0 n=0
pn may be determined.
These "steady state" solutions can be used to calculate an
approximation to the expected number of equipments down (unready) after
the mission has been under way for some time. Feller [1] shows that
the expected number of machines in line, waiting to begin processing
or repair, is
w-m- (^)(1-P n ) (2-3)
Even if we don't know p , we do know that it lies between zero and
unity, so very crudely
m - f—7-^) ^ w £ m, (2.4)
A
and better approximations can be derived with some effort. Work is
currently underway to build useful mathematical approximations to such
problems based on simplifications that occur when m becomes large.
But much that is useful as a supplement to (or replacement of) simu-
lations follows from adaptations of the above results.
(2.3) Alternative Assumptions and Results ; The Infinite Server
Approximation .
The assumptions in the previous section can, with benefit, be
relaxed in one direction, and made more general in another, if a
different model is constructed.
I will again assume that equipments break down at random, i.e.
the i— equipment has failure rate X. (i = 1 ,2 , 3 , . . . ,m) . The




is a completely arbitrary distribution, e.g. the log-normal. This
is a more general assumption than was made earlier, for there R. was
exponential. Furthermore, assume that the repair process is such that
there is no waiting to begin repair because of the presence of other,
prior failing, equipments. This rather strong assumption can perhaps
be justified if equipments do indeed fail infrequently enough, and
repair times are short enough. It will not be justified if there are
only a few repairmen (or teams) , as would be the case if there were a
drastic reduction in force, or if the quality of repair service degen-
erated, i.e. repair times increased because of inexperienced crews.
Results that may be obtained (we omit details) are as follows,
(a) The long-run or steady-state probability that a given system,
System i, is undergoing repair is
X.E[R.]
i i
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Actually, one can find the probability that System i is, or is
not, available at any time t following mission start with some-
what more difficulty.
Note . The above formula, (2.6), holds regardless of whether
failure times are exponentially distributed or not. It turns out
that long-run availability depends only upon mean or expected
time to failure, A.
,
in this model. Consequently, even if times
to failure have the Weibull, log-normal, or gamma distributions,
our formula holds well, and can .be used to check out or validate
simulations
.





E[# of Systems unavailable] = ) —r-f——r ,
. -. 1 + A .E [R.
J
1=1 11
and the variance of the number of unavailable equipments is
I A E[R ]
Var[# of Systems unavailable] = ) , —=7-
—777
(c) Furthermore, the probability that all systems are available is
I
,
P{all Systems available} = H ( ^ )
. n ^1+X .E[R. yi=l 11
because systems are supposed to fail and be repaired entirely
independently. This need not be a good model, but can be used
to check internal validity,
(d) Finally, if all X.E[R.] terms are of about the same magnitude
and are small compared to unity, as should frequently be the
case, then the distribution of the total number of Systems out
or unavailable will be approximately Poisson distributed.
Note . The above formulas are simple, explicit, and hence easy
to apply. They should approximate actual system availability
late in a mission if the failure rate is reasonably small; the
restriction to "late in a mission' 1 is necessary because our
results are for the steady state, which requires time to establish
itself. However, our steady-state results (average number of
systems down, for example) will typically be more optimistic than they
should be, because of the assumption that a repair may always
begin immediately. Thus our simple models can be immediately
employed to generate an upper bound on availability or readiness.
3 . More Realistic Repairman Models .
Certain simplifying assumptions made in the models just described
may be rectified with only a little trouble. The changes we suggest
will make the results more credible and valid, but, as seems inevitable,
there will be costs. The costs present themselves in the form of
increased mathematical complexity in model formulation and manipulation.
Nevertheless, these particular difficulties are quite surmountable if
a digital computer is available to carry out computations. Other costs
relate to the development of a better understanding of the maintenance
process, the gathering of relevant data on the effectiveness of training,
etc. Such data might come from fleet experiments and service school
experience. At the moment our models can only answer interesting "what
if" questions, consuming judgmental data.
(3.1) Individualizing the Repairman Models .
The basic repairman models assume that failure rates (demand
for repairs) of equipments are equal . In fact, this is rather unlikely.
Let us assume instead that there are m equipments with failure rates
A. (i = l,2,...,m), and one repairman (or crew) that services them
all. This latter restriction may easily be removed, and we make it
only to illustrate in a simple way the new analysis, which is straight-
forward but tedious and is not in the standard books. We will assume
that each equipment has its own repair rate (repair times are expo-
nentially distributed): repair rate for system i is u. (i = l,2,...,m)
Because the failure rates differ it is necessary to specify a
descriptive set of states for the entire system. I will first illustrate
10
this for only two systems or machines (e.g. a sonar and a computer),
leaving it up to the reader to generalize.
The Two-Equipments, One Repair Group , " System .
Consider the following possible states in which the system may
find itself. Of course, the states may be identified in any way,
e.g. by letters; the numbers we use mean nothing intrinsically.




Down First Down Second 3
Down Second Down First 4
Note especially the last two lines of the table: if repair is
conducted on a first-come, first-served basis the noted distinction
must be made. To explain, consider State 4: if this state prevails,
Equipment 1 failed first (and is undergoing repair) , while Equipment
2 is also down, but is awaiting repair. The reverse is true in
State 3. If priority repair is carried out, with priority determined
by expected repair time duration, then a simpler table (and fewer
equations) may result.
It is straightforward to write down the descriptive differential
equations. We make the usual assumptions. Let P.(t) be the proba-
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since exactly one state must prevail at any time. Thus, in order to
find the probabilities we must leave out one equation among (3.3)-(3.7),
but retain (3.8). In truth, these equations may be solved simultane-
ously to yield an algebraic formula in this simple case, but it will
probably be more effective to carry out solutions numerically after
plugging in suitable parameter values. A digital computer will do
this problem quite easily, utilizing standard codes for solving linear
12
equations. In general, the number of equations will be about 2
,
although this represents a low estimate in the present case. It is
far easier to count the number of machines in each condition (up,
down, undergoing repair, or waiting) than it is to keep track of
each machine or equipment. This is why the models described earlier
appear in text books, and why the later models, while more realistic,
are ignored
.
Note that matters strictly related to manpower quality and
training specifically enter these models through the repair rate
parameters u . : the higher the level of skill the larger will be u.,
and the greater the fraction of time that the equipment will be avail-
able. Incidentally, it might be noted that while the elaborate system
of states presented is required for analysis, only a few states are
really of interest: p„ is the probability that both equipments are
entirely available, p 1 is the probability that Equipment 1 is
available and Equipment 2 is not, while p is the reverse (Equipment
2 up, Equipment 1 down).
It should be clear that equations of the same form can be written
to describe more complex set ups (more machines, and more teams). Again,
although our model is simple it will at least be useful for checking
the internal validity of the SHIP II simulation program. Of course,
the solutions obtained are not time-dependent: we would anticipate
higher readiness towards the start of a cruise or mission than at the
end just because all systems should be initially operative. At another
time we will discuss time-dependent or transient solutions. These allow
13
us to trace changes in readiness as a mission progresses; the latter
changes may well reflect a repair capability that is inadequate to
keep up with failures.
14
4 . Preventive Maintenance and Repair .
Widely held conventional wisdom teaches that preventive
maintenance (p.m.) can eliminate or postpone chance failures that may
occur during an operation. Thus preventive maintenance may improve
readiness, and is included as part of the normal workload for that
reason. Several comments may be made, however.
(a) Some preventive maintenance activities may actually reduce
readiness, for example, if carried out by inexperienced and
unmotivated personnel. Certainly equipment is "down" while
testing and maintenance is under way, and logistics problems
may be created if unnecessary replacements are made. A service
school (for technicians) should provide a good environment for
deciding about the efficiency of preventive maintenance involving
various equipment types and differing levels of technician compe-
tence. An experimental program could be designed for dealing
with just this question.
(b) The present SHIP II model recognizes the existence of p.m. as
part of workload, but does not relate the effort, or its skill
level, to altered time between failures. While an exact relation-
ship would be difficult to establish, a reasonable class of models
can be constructed that reflect the behavior desired, and that
allows a decision maker to answer "what if?" questions concerning
reliability and maintenance activities.
I believe that the formulation of such an explicit model will
stimulate further inquiry into the interrelationship between p.m. and
15
readiness. I have no belief that the simple models suggested here are
precisely valid, suggesting only that they are more representative of
"real life" than is a model that ignores any possible relationship.
4 .1 One System, One Repair Team .
In order to make a beginning, we imagine that one system (a sonar,
for example) is served by one repair team. The latter is responsible
for p.m. and corrective maintenance (cm.). We suppose that p.m. is
intended to assure that cm. incidents occur as rarely as possible.
Model A . Let Xu be a high failure rate (short MTBF) , X T be
a low failure rate (long MTBF), (so X T < X„) , u be the repair rate,
and v be the rate at which p.m. activities are conducted. The signi-
ficance of the high failure rate vs. low failure rate (X vs. X )
contrast is that presumably the low failure rate occurs if correct,
successful, p.m. is performed, while otherwise X is in effect. We
also introduce a probability structure for the adequacy of p.m . If
current system state is H (so that X prevails) and if a p.m. is
n
performed then we let h (0 £ h £ 1) be the probability that the
system's state remains H, while with probability h = 1 - h it is
inadvertently shifted to L. Similarly, if the system is in L, let
I be the chance of remaining in L, while 1=1-1 is the chance
of passing to H when p.m. is performed. Thus, "good" p.m. is charac-
terized by h near unity, and I near zero. A little reflection
indicates that if the opposite is true then it may be desirable to have
a small value for v (p.m. rate or the rate of introducing p.m. activi-
ties)—thus meaning that the time between detrimental tinkerings is long.
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We also introduce another set of parameters analogous to h
and I in order to describe the results of cm. For the moment we
shall assume that when a failure occurs it is repaired at rate u,
regardless of its failure state just before failure. Also, we will
assume that it is restored to the low failure rate (L) state by
cm. with probability tt
, and to the high rate with probability tt .
These probabilities are independent of the past. They reflect the
quality of repair service, and hence of the assigned personnel, as is
the case with h and H .
The values of I and h, and of tt and tt , may differ
L rl
because of differing personnel policies. For instance, h and
may be low, yet tt is high, simply because new or relatively ill-
rl
trained personnel are assigned to preventive maintenance, but when a
failure (cm. incident) occurs the better people are brought into the ball
game. Whether this is a wise strategy obviously depends upon the
relationship between the various parameters; many times it will not be.
Now let UrjCt) De tne probability that our system is up at t,
and has failure rate X (i.e. is in state H) , let ul (t) denote
the probability that the system is up but is endowed with A (is
in state L) , and let r(t) denote the chance that the system is down
for cm. repair. All of our simple assumptions—many of which can be
immediately relaxed—indicate that we are dealing with a simple Markov
process in 3 states. Thus, we can write down differential equations
for u^(t), ll (t) , and r(t). Alternative methods of analysis are
also useful, especially when exponential distributions are jettisoned.
Such methods will be described later.
17
To derive the differential equations, and then the long-run
behavior, arguments go as follows. In order for the system to be in
state H at t + dt either (i) it was in H at t and did not
change in (t,t+dt), (ii) it was in L at t, preventive maintenance
occurred (instantaneously, by present assumption) , shifting the system
to H, (iii) it was on repair (cm.) at t, and repair was completed























Next, a similar argument leads to the equation









-^ = -[v£+XL ]uL + vhuH + ryTTL
(4.2)
Finally,
^(t) + u^t) + r(t) = 1, (4.3)
and one can solve (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) simultaneously. To obtain
a time dependent solution Laplace transforms may be used; the stationary
solution is obtained by setting the derivatives equal to zero in (4.1)
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and (4.2) and solving the resulting linear equations. Explicit
solutions will be given and discussed later.
Model B . It is helpful to generalize the previous model, and
to treat it in an alternative and more general way. To do so we will
first write expressions for the distributions of the time to failure
(cm. instants) starting from a repair completion time.
Let
A^ = an up-period duration, beginning with the equipment in state
L, having just ended cm. (or p.m.);
A^ = same, but referring to a cm. (or p.m.) that initializes the
equipment in state H.
Decomposition at the first event, followed by application of the convo-
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Here G is the distribution of the time between p.m. moments, measured
from a cm. termination. Simplification of (A. A) and (A. 5) yields two
simultaneous linear equations for the transforms
:






























where 6(s) represents the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the time
between successive p.m. moments. We give two examples:
—vx " ~"1Example 1 : G(x) = 1 - e ; G(s) = v(v+s) . This is the case of
random occasions for p.m. on the particular equipment. The expected
or average time between inspection is v . Such an assumption may
be reasonable if waits occur for crucial personnel who are otherwise
occupied doing cm. or other tasks. It is probably less realistic
than the next.
Example 2 . G(x) = (0, x < - ; G(s) = e V . This is the case of
1, x ^
v
regular inspections and p.m. actions, at time intervals of exact, non-
random length v
Other distributions for inspection intervals are possible. One
reasonable approach would be to determine G(x) empirically, either
from actual shipboard data or from simulations or more extensive models
In order to derive the stationary or long-run probability of
readiness we must have the expected values of A^ and \- and these
20
may be derived by differentiating (4.6) and (4.7), and then solving
the resulting linear equations. Laplace transform theory tells us






= E[A^ ] and lim = E[A^] . If we work directly
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From these we can find a general expression for long-run reliability,
r, of the system (probability that the system is in the up state).
r =
"h
e[V + "l e[al ] (4.12)
Optimum Inspection Interval
It is intuitively clear that if tt is close to one (so that
cm. usually returns the system to the low failure rate state), while
p.m. often switches the system from state L to state H, and if X
21
is much greater than X
,
then it is best to avoid p.m. In other
Li







and hence also maximizes the reliability r. For any given set of
parameter values we can of course explore E[A] as a function of v
by direct computation. Very probably this will be the only feasible
way of proceeding, especially when regular inspections and p.m. activi-
ties are carried out; see Example 2. In the case of Example 1 we can
actually find the optimum interval analytically or in closed form.
By simplification of (4.13) with the assistance of (4.10) and (4.11)
we find that
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Next, differentiation with respect to v is carried out, and the
result set equal to zero; the obvious concavity shows that at most one
interior maximum exists:
v = Optimum cm. Interval =
opt
[U+h)(X_ h+Xu I) - h X T -I X ]







+I V [XL + 1TL (XH-V ]
One qualitative fact that emerges is that if tt is increased, the
optimum p.m. interval also increases. The effect is to postpone cm.
actions that may cause a change to the high failure rate state. We
must, of course, check E[A] evaluated at v with its value when
22
v = or v = °°, for the true optimum may occur at one of those
points for certain parameter values.
23
5. Concluding Discussion .
I have attempted to present in this report several methods and
models that are relevant to studying manning problems of the type
addressed by the SHIP II simulation. Although the models here are not
as elaborate as those encompassed by SHIP II, more detail can be built
in by taking a mathematical approach. We believe that such supple-
mentary modeling should be carried out in parallel with most complex
simulations, if only to check on internal validity. Very possibly a
simple analytical model can be "fitted" to simulation data, leaving
certain parameters free for variation. An example might be the p.m.
rate appearing exogenously in our last model: the latter will depend
upon manpower level and other tasks, but could be estimated from
simulation data with the above parameters held fixed. We can then use
the model to estimate the effect of p.m. on reliability without actually
sampling. This would result in an obvious and welcome economy in
computational time. Avoidance of simulation when possible also avoids
the confusion of random error.
Future work in the present area will include consideration of
transient behavior of our repair processes. Under reduced, or less
skilled, manning, one would anticipate degradation of reliability
throughout a mission. This effect can be traced both by simulation
and by mathematical analysis. Finally, we plan to consider the presen-
tation of the mathematical results in the form of an interactive computer
program that a user can manipulate from a console. This enables an
analyst to change parameter values at will and by experimentation build
up a sound and useful feeling for the effects of various system parameters
24
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